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Abstract—Given that wireless communication occurs in a
shared and inherently broadcast medium, the transmissions
are vulnerable to undesired eavesdropping. This occurs even
when a point-to-point communication is sought, and hence a
fundamental question is whether we can utilize the wireless
channel properties to establish secrecy. In this paper we consider
secret communication between two special nodes (“source” and
“destination”) in a wireless network with authenticated relays:
the message communicated to the destination is to be kept
information-theoretically (unconditionally) secret from any eaves-
dropper within a class. Since the transmissions are broadcast and
interfere with each other, complex signal interactions occur. We
develop cooperative schemes which utilize these interactions in
wireless communication over networks with arbitrary topology,
and give provable unconditional secrecy guarantees.
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental aspect of wireless communication is its
broadcast nature, i.e., transmission from a node can be over-
heard (albeit through different channels) at several locations.
This property makes wireless communication inherently vul-
nerable to eavesdropping by an adversary. As the use of
wireless networks grows, this would be an important concern
to be addressed. This issue has been identified by recent
discoveries that the wireless 802.11 networks are vulnerable to
eavesdropping [4]. Therefore, a fundamental question is how
to ensure secrecy in wireless communication.
To ask this question we first need to address the notion of
secrecy that we seek. In 1948, Shannon introduced the notion
of information theoretic secrecy [15], in which he studied
whether communication from a source to a destination can be
kept secret from an eavesdropper, who has complete access to
the transmission, without any assumptions on computational
capabilities. As one would expect, such a question resulted in
the pessimistic answer that unless the source and destination
had somehow a large amount of shared common random-
ness (key) kept secret from the eavesdropper, the task was
impossible. In fact, the shared common randomness needed
was essentially of the same rate as the source message itself,
making it completely impractical. This observation led to the
computational approach pioneered by Diffie and Hellman [8],
where instead of having such a long shared secret key, a
shorter key is exploded into a larger one. The goal of the
design is to guarantee that there is no efficient algorithm
for the eavesdropper to discover the information transmitted.
For example, the security of the well-known RSA public-
key cryptosystem [14] is based on the difficulty of factoring
large integers, and other cryptographic protocols are based on
the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over groups.
Both these protocols are based on the (as of yet) unproven
computational intractability hypothesis for these algorithmic
problems.
Clearly the secrecy of any system can be enhanced if one
could have even a small amount of shared key between the
source–destination pair, which can be kept unconditionally
secret from an eavesdropper1. In particular one of our mo-
tivations for the formulation in this paper is that we can
potentially generate such secret key using physical wireless
channel properties. Such a functionality can be incrementally
deployed in networks by passing this secret key to the higher
layers in the network protocol stack where it could then be
used to enhance secrecy. In this respect, the two approaches to
secrecy can be complementary, with the information-theoretic
secrecy used to provide further secrecy opportunities. Of
course, in order to make this more practical, we need to
utilize some distinguishing property between the destination
and the eavesdropper in order to provide secrecy. In this
paper, we study this problem for a wireless network, where
a source node is transmitting to a destination node, with
the help of (authenticated) relay nodes, when an unknown
(passive) eavesdropper is also present in the network. We call
this setup cooperative secrecy, since the (authenticated) nodes
in the network cooperate to provide secrecy against potential
eavesdroppers.
In wireless communication, even though the signal from
the source is broadcast, it is received at the destination and
the potential eavesdropper through different (fading) channels.
It is this distinction that is exploited in information-theoretic
secrecy for broadcast channels in the seminal work of wire-
tap channels [20], [6]. However, not much is known about
the cooperative secrecy setup, where there are relay nodes
facilitating secure communication between a source and a
destination2. To the best of our knowledge, our work here
is the first to examine this problem for an arbitrary wireless
network and provide provable secrecy guarantees. The main
difficulties in dealing with arbitrary relay networks are (i) the
1Another motivation to study information-theoretic (or unconditional) se-
crecy might be that theoretically, quantum computers could make difficult
algorithmic problems tractable [16].
2Notable exceptions are some recent studies of techniques when there is a
single relay node present, as an extension of the classical relay channel to the
secrecy problem [11], [10].
broadcast nature of wireless communications, (ii) the fact that
signals from simultaneously transmitting nodes interfere with
one another at other nodes. These give rise to complex signal
interactions making the understanding of wireless networks
difficult. Though there has been some recent understanding
in terms of scaling laws for asymptotically large wireless
networks [9], [21], [12], there has not been a complete un-
derstanding of communication for the non-asymptotic regime.
Our work develops on the recent understanding of wireless
network information flow in [2], [3], which (approximately)
characterized the unicast (or multicast) capacity without se-
crecy constraints. Our formulation asks a natural question of
additionally keeping such a cooperative communication secure
against a class of potential eavesdroppers.
The main result of our paper is an achievable trade-off
between the reliable transmission rate from the source to the
legitimate destination and the amount of information leaked to
an eavesdropper over an arbitrary wireless relay network. We
assume that the exact location of the eavesdropper is unknown,
and therefore there is a class of potential eavesdroppers.
Roughly speaking, the trade-off is related to the information-
theoretic min-cuts3 between the source-destination and source-
eavesdropper pairs. In particular, one extreme point of the
trade-off is that we can ensure perfect secrecy (zero rate of
information leakage to the eavesdropper) for an information
rate of (approximately) the “difference” between these two
min-cut values. The other extreme point is to transmit infor-
mation to the legitimate destination at its min-cut while leaking
an information rate related to the “difference” between these
two min-cut values to the eavesdropper. The precise statements
and implications of our results are given in Section IV. We
also propose a noise insertion strategy by the authenticated
nodes in the network, which help the legitimate receiver for
secure communication. We illustrate many of the ideas in this
paper through a deterministic model for wireless networks
proposed in [1], [2]. The main results are proved for arbitrary
wireless networks for both deterministic as well as noisy signal
interaction models. These models are described more precisely
in Section II.
The paper is organized as follows. We give the precise
problem statement and motivate the wireless network models
studied in this paper in Section II. We give a series of examples
in Section III to illustrate some of the ideas in this paper.
We state the main results in Section IV and discuss some of
their implications. We sketch the overall proof in Section V,
while giving the proof details in the appendix. Apart from
this, the appendix also contains an extension of Theorem 1
and a corresponding numerical computation. We conclude in
Section VI with a discussion about possible extensions and
open questions raised by this work.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider transmission over a wireless relay network
G = (V ,L), where V is the set of vertices representing the
3The information-theoretic min-cut is related to the cooperative information
transfer rate [17], [3].
communication nodes in the relay network and L is the set
of annotated channels between the nodes, which describe the
signal interactions. Note that these channels are not point-to-
point links, rather, they model how the transmitted signals are
superimposed and received at the receiving nodes (i.e., there
is broadcast and interference). We consider a special node
S ∈ V as the source of the message which wants to securely
communicate to another special node D ∈ V (the destination)
with the help of a set of (authenticated) relay nodes A ⊂ V in
the network. The secrecy is with respect to a set of possible
(passive) eavesdropper nodes E ⊂ V where E is disjoint from
A∪{S,D}. We want to keep all or part of the message secret
if any one of the possible eavesdropper nodes E ∈ E listens
to the wireless transmissions in the relay network4.
Wireless interaction model: In this well-accepted model
[18], transmitted signals get attenuated by (complex) gains to
which independent (Gaussian) receiver noise is added. More
formally, the received signal yj at node j ∈ V at time t is
given by,
yj [t] =
∑
i∈Nj
hijxi[t] + zj [t], (1)
where hij is the complex channel gain between node i and
j which is the annotation of the channels in L, xi is the
signal transmitted by node i, and Nj are the set of nodes
that have non-zero channel gains to j. We assume that the
average transmit power constraints for all nodes is 1 and the
additive receiver Gaussian noise is of unit variance. We use
the terminology Gaussian wireless network when the signal
interaction model is governed by (1).
Deterministic interaction model: In [1], a simpler deter-
ministic model which captures the essence of wireless inter-
action was developed. The advantage of this model is its sim-
plicity, which gives insight to strategies for the noisy wireless
network model in (1). We will utilize this model in Section III
to develop intuition for the wireless network secrecy problem,
by giving illustrative examples for this model. Our main results
are developed for both this deterministic model as well as the
model in (1). The deterministic model of [1] simplifies the
wireless interaction model in (1) by eliminating the noise and
discretizing the channel gains through a binary expansion of
q bits. Therefore, the received signal y(d)j which is a binary
vector of size q is modeled as
y
(d)
j [t] =
∑
i∈Nj
Gijx
(d)
i [t], (2)
where Gij is a q × q binary matrix representing the (dis-
cretized) channel transformation between nodes i and j and
x
(d)
i is the (discretized) transmitted signal. All operations in
(2) are done over the binary field. We use the terminology
deterministic wireless network when the signal interaction
model is governed by (2). An illustration of this deterministic
4Our results apply also when all eavesdroppers in E are present, but cannot
collude since they are not allowed to transmit anything. In this paper we
restrict ourselves to the passive eavesdropper model, motivated by possible
secure authentication protocols [19] which could potentially discover an active
eavesdropper.
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model is given in Figure 1 for the broadcast and multiple
access networks. Figure 1(a) shows a deterministic model of
the broadcast channel, where the channel from the transmitter
to Receiver 1 is stronger than that to Receiver 2. This is
represented by the deterministic model developed in [1] with 5
most significant bits (MSB) of the transmitted signal captured
by Rx 1 and only 2 MSB of the transmitted signal captured by
Rx 2. The deterministic model of the multiple access channel
shown in Figure 1(b) adds one more ingredient, which is how
the bits from two transmitting nodes interact at a receiver.
In Figure 1(b) the channel from Tx 1 to Rx is stronger
than that of Tx 2. Therefore, the interaction is between the
2 MSBs of Tx 2 with the lower significant bits of Tx 1,
and the interaction is modeled with an addition over the
binary field (i.e., xor). This interaction captures the dynamic
range of the signal interactions. It was shown in [1], that
this model approximately5 captures the wireless interaction
model of (1) for the broadcast and multiple access channels.
For general networks the deterministic model yields insights
which, when translated to the noisy wireless network, lead one
to develop cooperative strategies for the model in (1), which
are (provably) approximately6 optimal [3].
Given the relay network with the above signal interaction
models given in (1) and (2), we want to ensure that we
can communicate reliably and secretly between S and D.
The notion of reliability is the standard information-theoretic
notion that the destination can decode the source message
of rate R with arbitrarily small probability of error. More
formally:
Definition 1: A (T, ǫ)-code is given by a (possibly) proba-
bilistic source encoding function fS mapping W to XS , a set
of deterministic relay encoding functions fi, mapping Yi to
Xi at each relay i ∈ A, and a deterministic decoding function
fD, mapping YD into an estimate Wˆ of the message. Here,
Xi = (xi[1], . . . , xi[T ]) and Yi are blocks of T symbols
(each symbol being a real or complex number or a binary
vector), and W is the information message, which is uniformly
distributed in the set {1, . . . , 2TR}. The quantity R is the
rate of the code. The probability of error of a (T, ǫ)-code is
required to be bounded by ǫ: P(W 6= Wˆ ) < ǫ.
The notion of information-theoretic secrecy is defined
through the equivocation rate Re, which is the residual uncer-
tainty about the message when the observation of the strongest
eavesdropper is given. More formally, [20], [6]:
Definition 2: Given a (T, ǫ)-code, the equivocation rate is
1
T
min
E∈E
H(W |YE), (3)
where W is the uniformly distributed source message, YE is
the sequence of observations at eavesdropper E and H(·|·)
denotes the (conditional) entropy [17].
5The approximation is in the sense that the capacity region of the determin-
istic model is within 1 bit of the capacity region of the Gaussian counterparts.
6It has been shown for single unicast there is an approximate max-flow,
min-cut result where the difference is within a constant number of bits, which
depends on the topology of the network, but not the values of the channel
gains [3].
In this paper, we also refer to the equivocation rate as simply
the “equivocation”.
Definition 3: A rate-equivocation pair (R,Re) is called
“achievable” if for any ǫ > 0, there exists a blocklength T
and a (T, ǫ)-code of rate R and equivocation Re.
By “perfect secrecy”, we mean a situation where a rate-
equivocation pair (R,Re) such that R = Re is achievable. If
we are only interested in such cases, we can use the following
quantity:
Definition 4: The perfect secrecy rate Rs of a network is
defined as
Rs , max{R : (R,R) is achievable}.
III. EXAMPLES
Through the examples in this section we seek to illustrate
the following ideas: (i) The operation of the relays to set up
cooperation; (ii) A source coding scheme to ensure secrecy;
(iii) Handling of a class of potential eavesdroppers; (iv) A
noise insertion/jamming scheme by relays to help secrecy. All
four examples are based on the deterministic wireless network
model developed in [1]. Though the examples illustrate these
ideas, proving the performance of a scheme for general net-
works in IV needs methods that are technically more difficult.
These are sketched in Section V and in the appendix .
A. Deterministic examples
S
R
D
E
Fig. 2. Example 1: The relay network with a single helper node providing
secrecy against a single eavesdropper.
Example 1: Consider the deterministic wireless network
in Figure 2 with a source S, a relay R and destination D
which wants secrecy from an eavesdropper E7. It is clear
that the maximum communication rate (with no concern for
secrecy) between the source and the destination is 3 bits.
As the channel from the source to the eavesdropper E is as
strong as that to the destination, we cannot ensure any secrecy
in the absence of a relay [6]. Therefore, the cooperation of
the relay is crucial to ensure secrecy. Suppose the source
transmits bits (W1[t],W2[t],W3[t]) at time t. Let the relay
transmit bits (W2[t− 1],W1[t− 1],W3[t− 1]) via its outputs,
7This is a replacement for a similar example that existed in a previous
version of this technical report, and that did not clearly illustrate the use of a
relay, since it implicitly assumed that there was no delay in the operation of
the relay R.
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(b) Multiple access channel
Fig. 1. The linear deterministic model for a Gaussian broadcast channel (BC) is shown in (a) and for a Gaussian multiple access channel (MAC) is shown
in (b).
where the symbols are delayed because the relay needs to
first hear the incoming signal before transmitting. The mixing
at the destination (and at the eavesdropper) is therefore of
bits transmitted at different times by the source. This is the
reason for the time index notion in this example. Assume that
the transmission takes place over T + 1 timeslots, but S only
transmits during the first T timeslots and therefore sends 3T
bits over T + 1 timeslots, resulting in a rate of 3T
T+1 → 3
bits per timeslot. R transmits information during timeslots 2
through T +1. At the end of timeslot t, we have the received
signals
yD[t] =

 W2[t− 1]W1[t− 1]⊕W1[t]
W3[t− 1]⊕W2[t]


and
yE [t] =

 0W2[t− 1]⊕W1[t]
W1[t− 1]⊕W2[t]

 .
At time 1, R does not transmit anything yet, and the
destination receives (0,W1[1],W2[1]). At time 2, D re-
ceives (W2[1],W1[1] ⊕ W1[2],W3[1] ⊕ W2[2]). At time 3,
D receives (W2[2],W1[2] ⊕ W1[3],W3[2] ⊕ W2[3]), and it
has now enough linearly independent equations to decode
W1[1], W1[2], W1[3], W2[1], W2[2] and W3[1]. In general,
at timeslot t ∈ {3, . . . , T}, D can decode (W1[1], . . . ,W1[t]),
(W2[1], . . . ,W2[t−1]) and (W3[1], . . . ,W3[t−2]). At timeslot
T + 1, the source S remains silent. Hence, D receives
(W2[T ],W1[T ],W3[T ]). It can use W2[T ] to decode W3[T−1]
which was still unknown, yielding full knowledge of all
transmitted bits. E receives (0,W1[1],W2[t]) during timeslot
1, and (0,W2[1] ⊕W1[2],W1[1] ⊕W2[2]) during timeslot 2,
which allows E to decode W1[1],W1[2],W2[1],W2[2] at the
end of timeslot 2. This argument also holds for all timeslots
t = 3, . . . , T , and thus, E can decode (W1[1], . . . ,W1[T ]) and
(W2[t], . . . ,W2[T ]). However, it is impossible for E to decode
any of the W3[t], t = 1, . . . , T , because it never receives any
information related to these bits. Thus, the scheme described
here achieves (R,Re) = (3, 1), and hence ensures 1 bit of
secrecy. The remaining examples of this section use layered
networks, where the notion of time can be ignored.
A1
1B 2B
E
D
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S
Fig. 3. Example 2: Two-layer network with single eavesdropper, with a
map-forward relaying strategy.
Example 2: We now study a larger deterministic wireless
network with A = {A1, A2, B1, B2}. The network is shown
in Figure 3. The information-theoretic cutset from S to D is
2 bits. This example illustrates that the relays do not have
to decode the source message to ensure secure and reliable
communication. The source S sends (W1,W2). Each relay
operates by taking a linear combination of its received signal
and transmitting it. One possible operation is when A1 sends
(0 ·W1)⊕ (1 ·W2) = W2 and B1 forwards its received signal
W1. Therefore A2 receives (W2) and B2 receives the linear
combination (W1⊕W2). Both A2 and B2 simply forward what
they receive via all of their outputs. As a result, D receives
(W2,W2 ⊕W1 ⊕W2), and it can solve this equation system
to obtain both information bits. E receives only (W1 ⊕W2),
which reveals one bit of information. To see this, we can
prepare the source bits (W1,W2) such that W1 = U1,W2 =
U1⊕U2 and therefore since E receives W1⊕W2 = U2, it has
no knowledge of U1 which is secret. This example therefore
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also illustrates a source-encoding scheme to ensure secrecy8.

E1
2E
B
A
D
S
Fig. 4. Example 3, showing the conflict created by multiple potential
eavesdroppers.
Example 3: In Figure 4, we illustrate the conflicting
needs for secrecy against a class of eavesdroppers, by hav-
ing E = {E1, E2}. The information-theoretic cutset bound
for the pair (S,D) is 3 bits. If there was only E1, we
could have the following scheme: S sends (W1,W2,W3), A
and B both send (W1,W2,W3, 0). In this case, D receives
(W1,W2,W3⊕W1,W2), while E1 receives (0, 0, 0, 0). Hence,
we could have a perfect secrecy situation, achieving (R,Re) =
(3, 3). If there was only E2, we could have the scheme: S
sends (W1,W2,W3), A sends (0,W1,W2,W3), while B sends
(W1, 0, 0, 0). In this case, D receives (0,W1,W2 ⊕W1,W3),
while E2 receives (0, 0, 0,W1 ⊕ W1) = (0, 0, 0, 0), again
leading to perfect secrecy. Now, when E = {E1, E2}, i.e.,
either eavesdropper (or both eavesdroppers) could be present,
we need to ensure secrecy against the set. A possible strategy
is: S sends (W1,W2,W3), A sends (0,W1,W2,W3), and B
sends (0,W1,W2,W3) or (W1,W1,W2,W3). In this case, D
receives (0,W1,W2,W3 ⊕ W1) or (0,W1,W2 ⊕ W1,W3 ⊕
W1), E1 receives (0, 0, 0, 0) or (W1, 0, 0, 0), and E2 receives
(0, 0, 0,W1) or (0, 0, 0, 0). In either case, we only achieve
(R,Re) = (3, 2) bits. Some additional thought also reveals
that it is not possible to make Re larger than 2 when E1 and
E2 can both be present. We thus see the tension created by
the uncertainty about the eavesdropper. 
Example 4: For the network given in Figure 5, we intro-
duce a new relaying strategy, where some of the authenticated
relay nodes actively help secrecy by inserting random bits into
the communication9. In a sense these relays are “jamming” the
eavesdropper and helping secure communication. The cutset
bound between (S,D) is 2 bits. Let the source send (W1,W2)
8Those who are familiar with secure network coding [5] might notice some
connections with this example. However, in network coding, the communi-
cation is over a graph and hence the medium does not impose broadcast and
interference, allowing for a larger range of strategies. In a wireless channel
the broadcast and multiple access properties are imposed by nature, making
the problem more difficult.
9A related strategy was developed in [10] for the Gaussian (single) relay
channel where the relay forwarded Gaussian noise along with decoded
information.
E
D
S
B
A
Fig. 5. Example 4: Example showing how noise insertion at a relay can
improve secrecy.
at its outgoing nodes. One strategy is that A sends (0,W1, 0),
and B sends (W2). In this case, D receives (0,W1,W2), while
E receives (0, 0,W2), yielding (R,Re) = (2, 1). Any strategy
where the relay does not insert randomness cannot ensure more
than 1 bit of secrecy. Now we allow A to generate a random
bit b before every transmission. Then, it transmits (b,W1, 0).
The transmitter at B remains unchanged. Now, D receives
(b,W1,W2). The eavesdropper E receives (0, 0,W2⊕ b), and
therefore we obtain perfect secrecy of 2 bits. This example
illustrates that active noise insertion by the relays can enhance
secrecy. 
B. A Gaussian example
In this section, we give an example of a scheme that
achieves perfect secrecy in a Gaussian wireless network.
Consider the diamond network shown in Figure 6, whose
channels are defined as follows.
Definition 5: The Gaussian diamond network is a network
with two relays A and B and one eavesdropper E, whose
channels are given by the equations:
yA[t] = hSAxS [t] + zA[t] (4)
yB[t] = hSBxS [t] + zB[t] (5)
yD[t] = hADxA[t] + hBDxB [t] + zD[t] (6)
yE [t] = hAExA[t] + hBExB[t] + zE[t]. (7)
S
D
E
hSB
A
B
hSA
hAD
hAE
hBE
hBD
Fig. 6. Gaussian diamond wireless network.
For simplicity assume that all channel gains are real, and
that |hSA| > |hSB|. Equations (4) and (5) together describe
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a stochastically degraded Gaussian broadcast channel, while
equations (6) and (7) each describe a Gaussian multiple-access
channel.
For an arbitrary θ ∈ [0, 1], define the following two
functions:
RBCmB (θ) ,
1
2
log
(
1 +
θh2SB
1 + (1− θ)h2SB
)
(8)
RBCmA(θ) ,
1
2
log
(
1 + (1− θ)h2SA
)
. (9)
It is well known [17] that for any θ ∈ [0, 1], one can reliably
transmit a message mB of rate RBCmB to B and simultaneously
transmit (mA,mB) to A, where mA is of rate RBCmA . We also
define the following region of rates:
Definition 6: For k ∈ {D,E}, we define RMACk as the
region of all pairs (RA, RB) satisfying
RA <
1
2
log(1 + h2Ak)
RB <
1
2
log(1 + h2Bk)
RA +RB <
1
2
log(1 + h2Ak + h
2
Bk).
Note that RMACk is the achievable rate-region of the multiple-
access channel from A and B to k, for k ∈ {D,E}.
Now, we describe an achievable perfect secrecy rate for the
Gaussian diamond network.
Theorem 1: In the Gaussian diamond network,
Rs ≥ max
»
R
BC
mA
(θ) +RBCmB (θ)−
1
2
log(1 + h2AE + h
2
BE)
–
,
(10)
where the maximization is over all θ ∈ [0, 1] for which
(RBCmA(θ), R
BC
mB
(θ)) ∈ RMACD
and for which the set
˘
(RjA , RjB ) ∈ R
MAC
E : RjA +RjB =
1
2
log(1 + h2AE + h
2
BE)
¯
∩
`
[0, RBCmA (θ)]× [0, R
BC
mB
(θ)]
´
is non-empty.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the appendix. A similar
theorem for the case when the relay nodes are allowed to insert
noise is given in Appendix VII-F. 
First note that the Gaussian diamond network of Figure 6
is very closely related to the deterministic wireless network
shown in Figure 5. In fact, the noise insertion strategy in
Example 4 can also be incorporated into the Gaussian case to
enhance the secrecy. Moreover, all the deterministic examples
given have Gaussian counterparts, and the strategies suggested
by the deterministic examples can also be implemented in
the Gaussian wireless model of (1). This is the connection
in the insight that is used in the results presented in Section
IV. However, for general networks, we need a strategy that
works for any network, making the use of more sophisticated
probabilistic methods outlined in Section V necessary.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
First, we introduce the notion of an information-theoretic
min-cut in a network.
Definition 7: We denote by Λi the set of all cutsets in the
network that separates the source S from node i:
Λi = {Ω ⊂ V : S ∈ Ω, i ∈ Ω
c}.
For a subset Ω ⊂ V , we denote by XΩ the tuple of all Xi for
i ∈ Ω.
Definition 8: The quantity minΩ∈Λi I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc) is
called the min-cut between the pair (S, i), where I(·; ·|·) is
the (conditional) mutual information.
Now, we state our two main results.
Definition 9: Let a distribution p({xi}i∈V) over all transmit
alphabets be given. We define R(p) to be the set of all pairs
(R,Re) satisfying
R < min
Ω∈ΛD
H(YΩc |XΩc),
Re < min
{
R, min
Ω∈ΛD
H(YΩc |XΩc)
−max
E∈E
min
Ω∈ΛE
H(YΩc |XΩc)
}
.
Theorem 2: In an arbitrary network with deterministic sig-
nal interaction as given in (2), all rate-equivocation pairs in
the region
R = ∪Q
i∈V p(xi)
R(p)
are achievable, where the union is taken over all possible
product-distributions on the transmit alphabets.
Theorem 2 guarantees the existence of codes for the region
of rate-equivocation pairs R. However, this is not a complete
characterization in that, we do not have a matching converse
stating that no strategy can achieve pairs (R,Re) that lie
outside this region. Also note that the result in Theorem 2 can
be generalized to include arbitrary deterministic interaction
functions, rather than the linear model given in (2), by using
techniques similar to those in [2].
Corollary 1: In a network with deterministic signal inter-
action as given in (2), the perfect secrecy rate Rs is lower
bounded as follows:
Rs ≥ maxQ
i∈V p(xi)
ˆ
min
Ω∈ΛD
H(YΩc |XΩc )−max
E∈E
min
Ω∈ΛE
H(YΩc |XΩc )
˜
.
Proof: From Theorem 2, whenever (R,Re) ∈ R, so is
(Re, Re), and perfect secrecy at rate Re is possible. Corollary
1 then directly follows from Definition 4.
Definition 10: Let a distribution p({xi}i∈V) over all trans-
mit alphabets be given. We define R˜(p) to be the set of all
pairs (R,Re) satisfying
RS < min
Ω∈ΛD
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc)− γ,
Re < min
{
RS − γ, min
Ω∈ΛD
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc)
−max
E∈E
min
Ω∈ΛE
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc)− γ
}
where γ is a constant which depends on the topology of the
network but not on the channel gains in L or the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) of operation.
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Theorem 3: In a Gaussian wireless network, all rate-
equivocation pairs in the region
R˜ = ∪Q
i∈V p(xi)
R˜(p)
are achievable, where the union is taken over all possible
product-distributions on the transmit alphabets.
Remark 1: The rate-equivocation pairs developed in the
examples 1–3 of Section III-A, can indeed be found by a
direct application of Theorem 2. Therefore, we can use this
result to find the performance for an arbitrary network with
deterministic signal interactions.
Remark 2: Note that since the gap γ is a constant and
the rates given in Definition 10 can grow with the SNR, this
gap can be made small with respect to the rates of operation.
Therefore, even though there is a gap of γ bits in the bound
on the equivocation in Theorem 3, it can be small with respect
to the total rate, i.e., we might leak only a small number of
bits for Gaussian wireless networks. However, we also believe
that this gap is a purely technical issue in the proof, and not
a fundamental problem arising in Gaussian wireless networks.
Indeed, the diamond example given in Section III-B shows that
such a gap may not exist and we can obtain perfect secrecy.
V. PROOF OUTLINES
In this section, we outline the proofs of Theorems 2 and
3, i.e., we prove the achievability of any (R,Re) ∈ R(p)
for the deterministic wireless network and the achievability of
any (R,Re) in R˜(p) for the Gaussian wireless network for
any fixed product distribution p. The proof is sketched for the
case when |E| = 2, i.e., there are only two eavesdroppers,
denoted by E = {E1, E2}. The generalization to an arbitrary
number of eavesdroppers is straightforward.
In both theorems, we claim the existence of a code that
operates at rate R and achieves equivocation Re. It was shown
in [2] that if there is no secrecy requirement, then a coding
strategy for the deterministic wireless network is the following:
The mapping fS is a mapping from {1, . . . , 2TR} to a set
of 2TR sequences, where each sequence is XS-typical as
defined in [7]. Similarly, the mapping fi at relay i ∈ A is
a mapping from the set of all possible receive sequences to
a subset of the Xi-typical transmit sequences. For Gaussian
wireless networks, there are infinitely many possible receive
sequences yi, and thus, relay i first uses a quantizer to quantize
Yi to a representation sequence Yˆi. Then, the mapping is
applied to Yˆi instead of Yi. The destination D declares wˆ if
it is the unique member of {1, . . . , 2TR} jointly typical with
receive sequence YD. In [2], it is shown for deterministic
wireless networks that if we select the mappings fS and
fi, i ∈ A at random, and then use the randomly selected
code, then the expected error probability is small as long
as R < minΩ∈ΛD I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc) and the blocklength T is
large enough. The expectation is taken over all random codes.
Hence, it follows that there exists at least one code which has
the desired error probability.
Note that although the existence of a good code is proved
via a random coding argument, the selected code itself is
deterministic. Now, we introduce the secrecy requirement.
To guarantee secrecy, the source-encoder at S needs to be
probabilistic. At the beginning of a block, when observing W ,
S will randomly generate two independent junk-messages J1
and J2, which are uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , 2TB1} and
{1, . . . , 2TB2}, respectively. In the following, Lemma 1 states
that if a code of this type satisfies certain conditions given
in Definition 11, then the region of rate-equivocation pairs
(19) and (20) is guaranteed to be achievable. The proof uses
the fact that for such a code, each eavesdropper is forced to
decode part of the junk (J1, J2) before being able to decode
W . Then, by making the rate of (J1, J2) large enough, we
can make it impossible for the eavesdroppers to decode W
at all. Finally, Lemmas 4 and 5 state that such secrecy-codes
actually exist for the networks we consider. Their proofs are
via a random code construction similar to the one in [2] and
[3], respectively.
Definition 11: A network is called securable with informa-
tion rate RD, junk rates RE1 , RE2 and gap ∆ if for any ǫ0 > 0
and for any (R,B1, B2) such that
R+B1 +B2 < RD, (11)
B1 +B2 < RE1 (12)
and
B2 < RE2 , (13)
there exists a code that encodes a message triple (W,J1, J2) ∈
{1, . . . , 2TR}×{1, . . . , 2TB1}×{1, . . . , 2TB2} into blocks of
length T , and which is such that
I(XS ;YE1) ≤ T (RE1 +∆), (14)
I(XS ;YE2) ≤ T (RE2 +∆), (15)
and
P(decoding (W,J1, J2) wrongly at D) ≤ ǫ0, (16)
1
2TR
2TR∑
w=1
P(A(1)w ) ≤ ǫ0 (17)
and
1
2T (R+B1)
2T R∑
w=1
2T B1∑
j1=1
P(A
(2)
w,j1
) ≤ ǫ0. (18)
Here, XS , YE1 and YE2 are the transmitted and received
sequences for this code when the messages W , J1 and J2 are
chosen uniformly and independently at random. Further, A(1)w
is the event that E1 makes an error when decoding (J1, J2)
given that W = w and assuming that W is available at E1.
Similarly, A(2)w,j1 is the event that E2 makes an error when
decoding J2 given that (W,J1) = (w, j1) and assuming that
W and J1 are available at E2.
Definition 11 is used in the following lemma, which gives an
achievable rate-equivocation region for any securable network.
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Lemma 1: If a network is securable with information rate
RD, junk rates RE1 , RE2 and gap ∆, then all rate-equivocation
pairs (R,Re) that satisfy
0 ≤ R < RD, (19)
0 ≤ Re < min
{
R,RD −max
E∈E
RE −∆
} (20)
are achievable.
Proof: Assume that a network is securable with informa-
tion rate RD and junk rates RE1 and RE2 . Without loss of
generality, assume that RE1 ≥ RE2 . Choose B1 and B2 as
B1 +B2 = RE1 − ǫ1 (21)
and
B2 = RE2 − ǫ1, . (22)
1 2
D
E
E2
1R   −
R   −
R   −
ε 1
ε1
ε1
R B B
Fig. 7. Illustration of the rate allocation in (21), (22) and (23).
Before each transmission block, the source S generates junk
messages (J1, J2) with rates B1 and B2. Assume that R =
RD − RE1 − ǫ1. In fact, if R is smaller than this quantity,
we artificially increase it by adding additional randomness. If
R is larger than this quantity, then we communicate part of it
through the junk messages. It follows that
R+B1 +B2 = RD − ǫ1. (23)
Then, since the network is assumed to satisfy Definition
11, we are assured the existence of a code with properties
(14) through (18). Let S use this code.
Then, (16) tells us that reliable decoding of (W,J1, J2) is
possible at the destination D. It remains to show that this code
also achieves an equivocation rate Re arbitrarily close to the
upper bound in (20). Using Lemma 2 given at the end of this
proof, the remaining uncertainty at eavesdropper E1 and E2
can be bounded as
1
T
H(W |YE1) ≥ R +B1 +B2 −
1
T
H(XS |W,YE1)
−
1
T
I(XS ;YE1) (24)
and
1
T
H(W |YE2) ≥ R +B1 +B2 −
1
T
H(XS |W,J1,YE2)
−
1
T
I(XS ;YE2)−
1
T
H(J1), (25)
respectively. In the application of Lemma 2, we set (a, b) to
be (W, 0) and (W,J1) for E1 and E2, respectively.
Note that together with a variation of Fano’s inequality,
stated in Lemma 3, (17), (18) imply that
1
T
H(XS |W,YE1) ≤ ǫ2 (26)
and
1
T
H(XS |W,J1,YE2) ≤ ǫ3. (27)
From (23), (24), (14) and (26), we get the bound
1
T
H(W |YE1) ≥ RD − RE1 −∆− ǫ1 − ǫ2.
For E2, we combine (23), (25), (15) and (27) with the identity
H(J1) = B1, and obtain
1
T
H(W |YE2) ≥ RD − RE2 −∆−B1 − ǫ1 − ǫ3. (28)
From (21) and (22) we get that RE2 +B1 = RE1 , hence
1
T
H(W |YE2) ≥ RD − RE1 −∆− ǫ1 − ǫ3.
It follows that by choosing ǫk, k = 1, 2, 3 sufficiently small,
the uncertainties at each of the eavesdroppers can be made
arbitrarily close to the right hand side of (20).
The following two lemmas are used in the proof of Lemma
1.
Lemma 2: Consider a set of random variables denoted by
(a, b), XS and YE . Then,
H(a|YE) ≥ H(XS)− I(XS ;YE)
−H(XS |a, b,YE)−H(b).
Lemma 3: Consider a deterministic code for a network
that transmits a pair of messages (W,J), that are uniformly
distributed in {1, . . . , 2TR} × {1, . . . , 2TB}. Let T be the
blocksize of the code, and assume that
1
2TR
2T R∑
w=1
P(Aw) ≤ ǫ0, (29)
where Aw is the event that a certain node E makes an error
when decoding J given that W = w and assuming that W is
available at E. Then, it follows that
H(XS |W,YE) ≤ 1 + TBǫ0.. (30)
The main results of this paper are consequences of the
following two lemmas:
Lemma 4: Given a deterministic wireless network and a
product distribution p on its transmit alphabets, the network is
securable with gap ∆ = 0 and the following information and
junk rates:
RD = min
Ω∈ΛD
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc)
RE1 = min
Ω∈ΛE1
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc)
RE2 = min
Ω∈ΛE2
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc).

Lemma 5: Given a Gaussian wireless network and a prod-
uct distribution p on its transmit alphabets, the network is
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securable with gap ∆ = γ and the following information and
junk rates:
RD = min
Ω∈ΛD
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc)− γ
RE1 = min
Ω∈ΛE1
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc)− γ
RE2 = min
Ω∈ΛE2
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc)− γ,
where γ is as in Definition 10.

The proof of Theorem 2 follows from Lemma 1 and
Lemma 4 by noting that for deterministic wireless networks,
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc) = H(YΩc |XΩc). The proof of Theorem 3
follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 5.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have formulated a communication sce-
nario with secrecy requirement for wireless networks with
cooperating relays which help to enhance the secrecy against
an eavesdropper. The eavesdropper’s wireless channel is not
exactly known but only known to belong to a class. The
way we generate secrecy uses the characteristic properties of
the wireless channel: the eavesdroppers channel is statistically
distinct from that of the destination and our schemes exploit
this difference to set up cooperation mechanisms to provide
secrecy. It is possible to interpret equivocation as secret key
generation, and therefore we can use the techniques outlined
in this paper to generate a unconditionally secure key. The
translation of message secrecy to key-generation is as follows.
Through proper coding, a part of the message of size equal
to the equivocation can be kept secret from any eavesdropper,
and thus play the role of a secret key that is communicated to
the destination. It should be noted the rate-equivocation results
presented in this paper are only achievability results, and not a
complete characterization of the rate-equivocation region. To
obtain such a characterization we need a matching converse
stating that no scheme can do better, and this is part of further
research. Even though through examples in Section III, we
discussed insertion of noise by the relays, the results presented
in Section IV are for deterministically operating relays. The
study of noise-inserting relays for arbitrary networks is also a
subject for further work.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
The proof follows through the following chain of inequali-
ties:
H(a|YE)
(a)
≥ H(a|YE , b)
= H(XS) +H(a,YE , b|XS)
−H(XS |a,YE , b)−H(YE , b)
(b)
≥ H(XS) +H(YE |XS)
−H(XS |a,YE , b)−H(YE , b)
(a)
≥ H(XS) +H(YE |XS)
−H(XS |a,YE , b)−H(YE)−H(b)
= H(XS)− I(XS ;YE)
−H(XS |a,YE , b)−H(b),
where the items marked with (a) are true because condition-
ing decreases the entroyp, and (b) follows by dropping the
variables a and b from the second term.
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B. Proof of Lemma 3
Let the assumptions of Lemma 3 be true. To show (30), we
start with the following inequality:
H(XS |W,YE) ≤ H(XS , J |W,YE)
= H(J |W,YE) +H(XS |J,W,YE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= H(J |W,YE),
where the indicated term is zero because the transmit sequence
XS is a function of (J,W ). We proceed to upper bound
H(J |W,YE). First, define the binary random variable
ξ , 1{AW },
where Aw is as defined in Lemma 3. In words, ξ indicates
whether J was wrongly decoded at E, given that W is
available at E. We expand the following joint entropy in two
different ways:
H(ξ, J |W,YE) = H(J |W,YE) +H(ξ|J,W,YE)
= H(ξ|W,YE) +H(J |W, ξ,YE). (31)
Knowing YE and W , we know the decision Jˆ = fD(YE ,W )
made by E, and hence
H(ξ|J,W,YE) = H(ξ|J, Jˆ ,W,YE) = 0.
Also
H(ξ|W,YE) ≤ H(ξ)
= h(P(ξ = 1))
≤ 1.
Using this, (31) implies
H(J |W,YE) ≤ 1 +H(J |ξ,YE ,W )
= 1 +
2T R∑
w=1
P(W = w)H(J |ξ,YE ,W = w)
= 1 +
2T R∑
w=1
1
2TR
H(J |ξ,YE ,W = w)
= 1 +
2T R∑
w=1
1
2TR
[
P(ξ = 0|W = w)
·H(J |ξ = 0,YE ,W = w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+P(ξ = 1|W = w)
·H(J |ξ = 1,YE ,W = w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤log(2T B−1)≤TB
]
≤ 1 + TB
1
2TR
2T R∑
w=1
P(ξ = 1|W = w)
= 1 + TB
1
2TR
2T R∑
w=1
P(Aw)
≤ 1 + TBǫ0,
where the last inequality is true because of (29).
C. Proof of Lemma 4
Let a network, a transmit product distribution p, and rates
R, B1 and B2 be given, with
R+B1 +B2 < min
Ω∈ΛD
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc), (32)
B1 +B2 < min
Ω∈ΛE1
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc) (33)
and
B2 < min
Ω∈ΛE2
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc). (34)
We show that there exists a code that satisfies (14) through
(18) in Definition 11.
Let the block-length be T . We generate a random codebook
in the following way. For the source node S, each (W,J1, J2)
is mapped to a sequence xS , drawn uniformly at random
from the set of all XS-typical sequences (with respect to the
distribution p). For each relay node i ∈ A, each possible input
sequence yi is mapped to a sequence xi, drawn uniformly
at random from the set of Xi-typical sequences. Once this
random code generation process is finished, the mappings are
deterministic and fixed for all time. From (32) and the proof
of Theorem 2.1 in [2], it is clear that for T large enough,
E [P(decoding (W,J1, J2) wrongly at D)] ≤
ǫ0
3
, (35)
where the expectation is taken over all (randomly generated)
codes. On the other hand, for a fixed W = w, the number of
codewords used at S is 2T (B1+B2), and there is (statistically)
no difference between this collection of codewords and a ran-
domly generated codebook of size 2T (B1+B2). Hence, if both
S and E1 know W , then the error probability analysis from
[2] can be applied again for every fixed W = w, and we find
that as long as (33) holds, we have E
[
P(A
(1)
w )
]
≤ ǫ03 when T
is large enough. Since this is true for any w ∈ {1, . . . , 2TR},
we obtain
E

 1
2TR
2T R∑
w=1
P(A(1)w )

 = 1
2TR
2T R∑
w=1
E
[
P(A(1)w )
]
≤
ǫ0
3
. (36)
We apply the same argument once more for E2 and for each
fixed (W,J1) = (w, j1), to obtain
E

 1
2T (R+B1)
2T R∑
w=1
2T B1∑
j1=1
P(A
(2)
w,j1
)

 ≤ ǫ0
3
. (37)
Note that if networks are non-layered as defined in [2], than
some care must be taken when using the proof of Theorem
2.1 in [2]. In a non-layered network, some relay nodes may,
during a certain block of time-slots, receive a signal which
depends on sequences x(k1)S and x
(k2)
S that were transmitted
during different past blocks k1 and k2. To resolve this, the
scheme needs to be operated over a sequence of transmission
blocks, and the decoding is done over the sequence of blocks
10
rather than over a single block. Details of this proof technique
for non-layered networks can be found in [2].
Summing (35), (36) and (37), we see that
E
[
P(decoding (W,J1, J2) wrongly at D)+
1
2TR
2T R∑
w=1
P(A(1)w )+
1
2T (R+B1)
2T R∑
w=1
2T B1∑
j1=1
P(A
(2)
w,j1
)
]
≤ ǫ0,
where the expectation is over all codes. From this, we conclude
that for at least one of the codes, (16), (17) and (18) are true
at the same time.
It remains to show that the code satisfies (14) and (15). Let
E ∈ {E1, E2}, and fix any cut Ω ∈ ΛE .
Assume that the network is layered. Note that whenever we
write I(XS ;YE), what we mean is I(XS(M1);YE(M1)),
where M1 = (W1, J1,1, J2,1) is the message transmitted
during block 1 (information and junk messages combined),
which is uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , 2T (R+B1+B2)}. So
far, we have not mentioned that if E cannot directly receive
the signal transmitted by S, then XS(M1) and YE(M1)
are blocks that occur at different instances in time. If, for
instance, there is one layer of relays between S and E, then a
relay node A would receive YA(M1) during the transmission
of XS(M1) by S, but it would transmit XA(M1) during
next block of length T , during the reception of YA(M2). E
would therefore start receiving the block YE(M1) after S
has finished transmitting XS(M1). Let K be a large positive
integer. We assume that transmission takes place over many
time-blocks, but we focus on a window of K time-blocks,
each of length T . We define a new set of vectors (XV ,YV)
of length (K+L)T , where L is the number of layers of relay-
nodes that connect S to E in the network. Recall that V is
the set of all nodes in the network, and A is the set of relay
nodes. Let Al ⊆ A be the set of relay nodes that lie in layer
l. For l = 0, . . . , L, define
XAl(M) ,


XAl(M1−l)
.
.
.
XAl(M0)
XAl(M1)
.
.
.
XAl(MK)
XAl(MK+1)
.
.
.
XAl(MK+L−l)


and
YAl(M) ,


YAl+1(M1−l)
.
.
.
YAl+1(M0)
YAl+1(M1)
.
.
.
YAl+1(MK)
YAl+1(MK+1)
.
.
.
YAl+1(MK+L−l)


,
where we set A0 , {S} and AL+1 , {E}, and M =
{M1−L, . . . ,MK+2L} is the set of all messages involved
during K + 3L blocks. Assume that transmission of the first
message M1 starts at t = 1. We then have that the t-th
component of each super-block Xi or Yi, i ∈ V is actually
received or transmitted at time t. We have the following chain
of inequalities, which closely follows the proof of Theorem
14.10.1 in [17]:
I(XS ;YE)
(a)
≤ I(XΩ;YΩc)
=
(K+L)T∑
t=1
I(XΩ;Y Ωc [t]|Y Ωc [1], . . . , Y Ωc [t− 1])
=
(K+L)T∑
t=1
[
H(Y Ωc [t]|Y Ωc [1], . . . , Y Ωc [t− 1])
−H(Y Ωc [t]|Y Ωc [1], . . . , Y Ωc [t− 1],XΩ)
]
(b)
≤
(K+L)T∑
t=1
[
H(Y Ωc [t]|Y Ωc [1], . . . , Y Ωc [t− 1], XΩc [t])
−H(Y Ωc [t]|Y Ωc [1], . . . , Y Ωc [t− 1],XΩ, XΩc [t])
]
(c)
≤
(K+L)T∑
t=1
[
H(Y Ωc [t]|XΩc [t])
−H(Y Ωc [t]|XΩ[t], XΩc [t])
]
=
(K+L)T∑
t=1
I(XΩ[t];Y Ωc [t]|XΩc [t])
(d)
→ (K + L)T I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc),
as T and K grow large. The steps are justified below:
(a) The mutual information is made larger by adding
more super-blocks on each side.
(b) XΩc [t] is what is transmitted by all nodes in Ωc at
time t and thus is a function of everything that was
received by all nodes in Ωc up to time t− 1. Hence,
we have equality in the first term. The second term
is dicreased by further conditioning on XΩc [t].
(c) The first term is increased by dropping a part of
the conditioning. For the second term, we use the
fact that Y Ωc [t] depends only on the current transmit
values XΩ[t], XΩc [t].
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(d) Assume that t ∈ {(k − 1)T + 1, . . . , kT} for some
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K + L}, i.e., assume that t lies in
the k-th block of the super-block. Consider the
first layer: (XS [t], Y A1 [t]) is a fixed component
of (XS(Mk),YA1(Mk)), which is a set of jointly
typical sequences with respect to pXSpYA1 |XS ,
picked uniformly at random from a codebook of
size 2T (R+B1+B2). Hence, as T grows large, the
joint distribution of (XS [t], Y A1 [t]) converges to
pXSpYA1 |XS . We advance one layer in the network:
The tuple (XA1 [t], Y A2 [t]) is a fixed component of
the tuple of sequences (XA1(Mk−1),YA2(Mk−1)),
which is a member of a collection of jointly typ-
ical sequences with respect to pXA1 pYA2 |XA1 . In
addition, the tuple of sequences is independent of
the tuple in the first layer, because the message
Mk−1 is independent of Mk. Nevertheless, it follows
that the distribution of (XA1 [t], Y A2 [t]) converges to
pXA1 pYA2 |XA1 . We do so for each layer, and we find
that the distribution of (XV [t], Y V [t]) converges to
L+1∏
l=1
pXAl−1 pYAl |XAl−1 . (38)
The product comes from the fact that all involved
messages Mk through Mk+L are independent. But
because p{Xi}i∈V was chosen to be a product dis-
tribution, (38) is nothing but pXVpYV |XV . Then,
because the mutual information is a continuous
function of the underlying distribution, it holds that
I(XΩ[t];Y Ωc [t]|XΩc [t]) → I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc) for all
t.
Finally, we can write
I(XS ;YE)
(a)
≥
I(XS(M1), . . . ,XS(MK);YE(M1), . . . ,YE(MK))
(b)
=
K∑
k=1
I(XS(Mk);YE(Mk))
= KI(XS(M1);YE(M1)), (39)
where we obtain (a) by dropping all terms in XS and YE
that depend on messages different from M1, . . . ,MK , and (b)
is true by the independence of the Mk. Combining (39) with
the chain of inequalities, we get
I(XS(M1);YE(M1)) ≤
K + L
K
TI(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc)
→ TI(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc) (40)
as K grows large.
Since (40) is true for any Ω ∈ ΛE , we have that
I(XS(M1);YE(M1)) ≤ T min
Ω∈ΛE
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc),
which proves that the code satisfies (14) and (15), with ∆ = 0.
For non-layered networks, a similar argument can be made,
by considering communication over many super-blocks.
D. Proof of Lemma 5
The proof for the Gaussian case is very similar to the proof
of Lemma 4, except that this time, we use results in [3].
For a given network G and a given product distribution p,
we have that when we use a randomly generated codebook
for (W,J1, J2) at the source node S and vector quantizers
followed by randomly generated mappings at the relay nodes,
then the three error probabilities of interest, averaged over all
codes, are all small as long as
R+B1 +B2 < min
Ω∈ΛD
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc)− γ, (41)
B1 +B2 < min
Ω∈ΛE1
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc)− γ (42)
and
B2 < min
Ω∈ΛE2
I(XΩ;YΩc |XΩc)− γ. (43)
We can conclude that a code that satisfies (16), (17) and (18)
exists, with the information- and junk rates given by the right
hand sides of (41), (42) and (43), respectively.
We use exactly the same upper bounding technique as in
Appendix VII-C, and we obtain that the gap between the rates
and the corresponding bounds is ∆ = γ.
E. Proof of Theorem 1
The claim of the theorem is that communication at a rate
arbitrarily close to the one given in the optimization (10) is
possible with perfect secrecy. It suffices to show the existence
of a code that achieves this:
Let θ be such that
(RBCmA(θ), R
BC
mB
(θ)) ∈ RMACD (44)
and such that
BE ∩
`
[0, RBCmA(θ)]× [0, R
BC
mB
(θ)]
´ (45)
is non-empty, where
BE =
{
(RjA , RjB ) ∈ R
MAC
E :
RjA +RjB =
1
2
log(1 + h2AE + h
2
BE)
}
. (46)
Then, define RD = RBCmA(θ) + R
BC
mB
(θ) and RE = 12 log(1 +
h2AE + h
2
BE), and let R = RD − RE − ǫ1. Let W be the
information message, uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , 2TR}.
We split W into two parts, WA and WB , of rate RwA and
RwB , respectively, such that Wk is uniformly distributed in
{1, . . . , 2TRwk }, for k ∈ {A,B}. Before each transmission
block, the source S generates two junk messages JA and JB ,
uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , 2TRjA} and {1, . . . , 2TRjB },
respectively. Define MA = (WA, JA) and MB = (WB , JB).
The junk rates RjA and RjB are picked arbitrarily such that
(RjA , RjB ) ∈ BE ∩
(
[0, RBCmA(θ)] × [0, R
BC
mB
(θ)]
)
.
The information rates are chosen as
Rwk = R
BC
mk
(θ) −Rjk −
ǫ1
2
,
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for k ∈ {A,B}. Note that this choice ensures
Rmk = Rwk +Rjk < R
BC
mk
(θ), (47)
and hence, by the Gaussian broadcast channel achievability
result [17], there exists a broadcast code from S to A and B
such that A can decode (MA,MB) and B can decode MB,
with arbitrarily small error probability.
The relays operate as follows: A discards message MB
and encodes MA only, while B encodes MB . The encoding
function used at k is a randomly, uniformly generated mapping
from {1, . . . , 2TRmk } to the set of Xk-typical sequences of
length T . This code is generated once at random, and is fixed
and deterministic thereafter. It can be shown, similarly to the
proof of Lemma 4, that the two properties
(RmA , RmB ) ∈ R
MAC
D
and
(RjA , RjB ) ∈ R
MAC
E
imply that
E
[
P(wrong decoding of (MA,MB) at D)+
1
2T (RwA+RwB )
2T RwA∑
wA=1
2T RwB∑
wB=1
P(A˜wA,wB )
]
≤ ǫ0,
where A˜wA,wB is the event that E wrongly decodes (JA, JB)
given that (WA,WB) = (wA, wB) is available at E. From this,
using an adaption of Fano’s inequality similar to Lemma 3, it
follows that there exists a code for which the error probability
at D can be made small, and for which
H(JA, JB|WA,WB,YE) ≤ ǫ2.
Now, we are ready to bound the equivocation at E. From
Lemma 2, we have
H(W |YE) = H(WA,WB |YE)
≥ H(XA,XB)− I(XA,XB;YE)
−H(XS |WA,WB ,YE)
= H(MA,MB)− I(XA,XB;YE)
−H(XS |WA,WB ,YE)
= T
(
RBCmA(θ) +R
BC
mB
(θ)
)
− I(XA,XB;YE)− T ǫ1 − T ǫ2
≥ T
(
RBCmA(θ) +R
BC
mB
(θ)
)
− T
1
2
log(1 + h2AE + h
2
BE)− T ǫ1 − T ǫ2,
Where we upper bounded I(XA,XB;YE) by the sum-rate
capacity of the multiple access channel from (A,B) to E.
Therefore, by choosing ǫ1 and ǫ2 small enough, the equivoca-
tion 1
T
H(W |YE) can be made arbitrarily close to RD −RE ,
hence we have perfect secrecy.
F. The Gaussian Diamond Network with Noise Insertion
In this section, we guarantee a certain secrecy rate in the
Gaussian diamond network (Definition 5) when the relay
nodes A and B are allowed to insert noise. In particular,
both relay nodes are permitted to select a junk message of
arbitrary rate uniformly at random before each transmission
of a block and to use this junk message during the encoding.
The following theorem states an achievable secrecy rate under
this additional assumption.
Theorem 4: In the Gaussian diamond network with noise
insertion,
Rs ≥ max
»
RmA +RmB −
1
2
log(1 + h2AE + h
2
BE)
–
, (48)
where the indicated maximization is over all (θ,RmA , RmB )
for which
(RmA , RmB ) ∈ R
MAC
D
and ∃(RjA , RjB ) ∈ BE such that
(RmA , RmB ) ∈ [RjA , RjA+R
BC
mA
(θ)]×[RjB , RjB +R
BC
mB
(θ)],
where BE is defined in (46).
The proof of Theorem 4 is very similar to that of Theorem
1. The perfect secrecy rate is achievable by the same code
construction, with the difference that the junk messages JA
and JB are generated at A and B, respectively. Thanks to this,
the broadcast channel between S and (A,B) can be fully used
to send the information messages WA and WB . The secrecy
rate is then limited by the capacity of this broadcast channel,
as well as by the amount of secrecy the two multiple access
channels (from (A,B) to D and to E) can provide. Note that
this result resembles the “noise forwarding” strategy for the
relay network in [10]. However, our scheme for the Gaussian
diamond network can be extended to a number of different
networks, since we are in general interested in results that
guarantee secrecy for any network.
G. A Numerical Example for the Gaussian Diamond Network
In this section, we provide a numerical example for the
achievable perfect secrecy rates in Theorems 1 and 4.
Let hSA = hAD = 2 be the stronger channel gains. All
other channels gains are hSB = hBD = hAE = hBE = 1.
The multiple access channel (MAC) capacity regions are then
given by
RMACD = {(RA, RB) :
RA <
1
2
log 5 ≃ 1.16 bits,
RB <
1
2
log 2 = 0.5 bits,
RA +RB <
1
2
log 6 ≃ 1.29 bits}
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and
RMACE = {(RA, RB) :
RA <
1
2
log 2 = 0.5 bits,
RB <
1
2
log 2 = 0.5 bits,
RA +RB <
1
2
log 3 ≃ 0.79 bits}
These two capacity regions are shown in Figure 8.
0.5 1 1.160.62
0.29
R
RB
A
R
R2
1
Fig. 8. The MAC capacity regions RMAC
E
(small pentagon) and RMAC
D
(large
pentagon). The overall rate pair (RmA , RmB ) is marked by a cross and a
circle for the strategies with and without noise insertion, respectively. The
achievable secrecy rate without noise insertion (R1) and with noise insertion
(R2) are indicated. The transmit power as well as the noise variance are 1,
and the channel gains are as given in the beginning of this section.
1) Case without Noise Insertion: If the relay nodes do not
insert noise, we compute the perfect secrecy rate given by
Theorem 1, i.e., we maximize
RBCmA(θ) +R
BC
mB
(θ) =
1
2
log
(
1 + 4(1− θ)
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
θ
1 + (1− θ)
)
under the conditions that (RBCmA(θ), R
BC
mB
(θ)) ∈ RMACD and
that BE ∩
(
[0, RBCmA(θ)]× [0, R
BC
mB
(θ)]
)
should be non-empty.
We find that the optimal value of θ is θopt ≃ 0.66, and
RmA = R
BC
mA
(θopt) ≃ 0.62 bits,
RmB = R
BC
mB
(θopt) ≃ 0.29 bits.
This point is marked with a circle in Figure 8. The achievable
perfect secrecy rate is
R1 = RmA +RmB −
1
2
log(1 + h2AE + h
2
BE)
≃ 0.62 + 0.29− 0.79 = 0.12 bits. (49)
2) Case with Noise Insertion: For the case when noise
insertion at the relay nodes is permitted, we compute the
perfect secrecy rate given by Theorem 4. It is easy to see
that by choosing for instance RjA = 0.5 and RjB = 0.29, we
can achieve an overall rate of
RmB ≃ 0.29 bits
RmA =
1
2
log(1 + h2AD + h
2
BD)−RmB
≃ 1.29− 0.29 = 1 bit.
This point is marked with a cross in Figure 8. In this case, the
achievable perfect secrecy rate is
R2 = RmA +RmB −
1
2
log(1 + h2AE + h
2
BE)
≃ 1 + 0.29− 0.79 = 0.5 bits.
This secrecy rate is considerably larger than (49). The two
achievable secrecy rates R1 and R2 are also shown in Figure 8.
Note that since all the rates are measured in bits, all logarithms
are base 2.
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